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Abstract—Stricter data protection regulations and the poor
application of privacy protection techniques have resulted in a
requirement for data-driven companies to adopt new methods
of analysing sensitive user data. The RAPPOR (Randomized
Aggregatable Privacy-Preserving Ordinal Response) method adds
parameterised noise, which must be carefully selected to maintain
adequate privacy without losing analytical value. This paper
applies RAPPOR privacy parameter variations against a public
dataset containing a list of running Android applications data.
The dataset is filtered and sampled into small (10,000); medium
(100,000); and large (1,200,000) sample sizes while applying
RAPPOR with  = 10; 1.0; and 0.1 (respectively low; medium;
high privacy guarantees). Also, in order to observe detailed
variations within high to medium privacy guarantees ( = 0.5 to
1.0), a second experiment is conducted by progressively adjusting
the value of  over the same populations. The first experiment
verifies the original RAPPOR studies using  = 1 with a non-
existent recoverability in the small sample size, and detectable
signal from medium to large sample sizes as also demonstrated
in the original RAPPOR paper. Further results, using high
privacy guarantees, show that the large sample size, in contrast
to medium, suffers 2.75 times more in terms of recoverability
when increasing privacy guarantees from  = 1.0 to 0.8. Overall,
the paper demonstrates that high privacy guarantees to restrict
the analysis only to the most dominating strings.
Index Terms—Privacy Parameter Variation, Privacy Preserva-
tion, Big Data, RAPPOR
I. INTRODUCTION
Big data and the sharing of research data containing Per-
sonal Private Information (PII) such as medical data is grow-
ing, and the necessity of protecting citizens privacy follows
[1], [2]. The General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) also
widens the scope of PII and increases the responsibility of data
processors and controllers [3]. In order to study tendencies
about a population, data about its members have to be collected
and protecting the privacy of the users is often an ethical and
a legal responsibility for data controllers.
So how can citizen privacy be guaranteed while the data
can still provide analytical value? Researchers propose Privacy
Preserving Techniques (PPT) which allow the sharing of
datasets with PPI while providing a certain degree of privacy
or anonymity for individuals. However, the application of these
PPT’s often compromises the analytical value at the cost of
privacy and vice-versa. RAPPOR [4] is a method that seeks
to bridge this gap by applying Differential Privacy guarantees
to collect data using an algorithm that relies on adjustable pa-
rameters that can provide varying levels of privacy guarantee.
Anonymity and privacy may often be mistaken or inter-
changed. Pfitzmann [5] defines anonymity as not disclosing the
identity of a user reporting on actions, whereas privacy is the
right to not disclosing whether an individual has performed a
given action. As such, anonymity may be harmed given the ex-
istence of a known user in a dataset, while privacy is unharmed
as long as that user’s actions or answers remain unknown [6].
Data collectors have traditionally applied PPT over released
datasets through anonymisation and de-identification tech-
niques. Unfortunately, these are often insufficient, as seen with
the re-identification of AOL users from released, anonymised
search queries [7]. Other examples include the identification
of individuals via correlation of common demographic data
such as zip codes, gender and date of birth [8] or the de-
anonymisation of sanitised data performed on the Netflix Prize
data mining contest [9], [10].
This paper aims to observe the impact of such privacy
parameter variations by applying the RAPPOR algorithm on
three samples generated from a publicly available Android
Malware analysis dataset [11], and thus evaluate the usability
of differential privacy and to establish some configuration
guidelines that satisfy both privacy guarantees and data con-
trollers’ necessities.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
Differential Privacy proposes a new, formal definition of
privacy, and focuses on the study of population statistics while
enforcing a strong deniability of individuals’ data through
the addition of noise [12]. Being the only privacy guarantee
that offers objective metrics about the level of confidentiality
provided by a method [13], the theoretical work started by
Dwork et al [12] has increasingly been incorporated to new
research and practical cases [14]–[16]. Its examples of inte-
gration include Apple, Microsoft and Google [17]–[19].
Differential Privacy is a definition of privacy whose ultimate
paradigm states that no new knowledge of any individual
should be learnt from accessing the data [20], [21]. According
to the differential privacy paradigm, the ability of an attacker
to learn something about an individual should not be related
to the presence or absence of the person in the dataset. This
protection can thus be used encourage people to participate
and give more honest answers, as the noise grants an objective
level of maximum leakage, as well as a strong deniability
against any conclusion that an adversary may extract from
isolated records.
Although it is considered the gold standard in current
privacy preservation research by authors like [22] or [23],
some of the originators of core methods insist in saying that
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it is no panacea [24], and that each case must be studied
individually for good tuning of the parameters. As an example
of its recognition amongst scholars, one of the papers where
the method was initially presented [12] was given the Test-of-
Time award [25].
III. METHODOLOGY
The RAPPOR algorithm is conceived as a client-server
architecture where the response of the clients will be auto-
matically randomised before transferred to the server for the
aggregation with the other responses [26]. This is a non-
interactive process [24], as the original data would not be
recoverable. Using the RAPPOR algorithm, each response is
encoded using Bloom filters [27] on which noise is added [4].
As part of the algorithm, the parameters can be adjusted to
cater for various levels of privacy.
Noise is added to the Bloom filter following the surveying
technique of randomised response [4]. This theory first pro-
posed by [28] and was designed to encourage participants in a
survey to answer more honestly to sensitive questions: A coin
was flipped to decide whether the answer to the question would
be automatically yes or the honest response, providing a strong
deniability to such answer. Probability theory dictates that half
of the population would have answered yes regardless of the
truth. Assuming that the other half of the answers were truthful
and that the proportions in the population are represented
accurately enough on the sample, the real proportion of no
would be the double of the proportion obtained from the
survey.
After the Bloom filter is generated, two different randomi-
sation phases are used to generate the final noisy response [4].
In this paper, we modify the following parameters:
• f Probability of reporting lies.
• p Probability of reporting noise.
• q Probability of reporting a true answer.
A. Data set considerations
Taking the work of Erlingsson [4] as a reference, it can be
extracted that, for  = ln(3), a dataset of 10,000 answers will
be insufficient to extract useful information. A higher value
of  should guarantee an improved resemblance between the
recovered information and the original data. Furthermore, the
election of  = ln(3) is not justified in this original work,
which seems to point that this level of protection is simply
appropriate for testing. A question that naturally arises from
this is: How different values of  affect the accuracy of the
data?
As Hsu et al. state [22], a procedure for selecting values for
 that are: optimal; sufficient; and non-excessive is something
that seems to be missing in the literature. This absence, at least
partially, is due to the difficulty of estimating an optimal value
for a single variable that must consider factors such as: the size
and diversity of the dataset; the sensitivity of the information
contained inside this; and the level of accuracy required for
the reconstruction of the noisy response. In the design of such
a system, the main disadvantage of the simplification of a
scenario is the complexity of its optimisation.
Considering this situation, it appears to be evident that
elaborating a general rule for predicting how the variation of
 will affect the privacy and fidelity levels of a specific dataset
is something far from simple. An empirical demonstration of
a progressive quality degradation of the recovered data as 
decreases could clarify this matter and help other researchers.
Erlingsson et al [4] also outline the case where there could
be a loss of information due by an over-sized dataset and
its consequent growth of noise after the RAPPOR process:
Smaller, real values could be obfuscated by the noise due
to their proportionally reduced presence, creating a situation
where, literally, more is less. In spite of being a logical
conclusion, this affirmation is not supported by empirical data,
which leads to wonder how and where that inflexion point
could be found.
The paper thus aims to evaluate the effect of the following
on an Android malware dataset:
• Investigate the value of . Decreasing the value of 
will offer noisier results, and these might not be even
useful if the amount of data collected is not enough. How
the variation of this parameter will be affected by the
retrieved data, is thus key to the design of a procedure
that offers reliable information to the data controller while
protecting the privacy of users.
• Investigate the size of the dataset. For the same value
of , how will the results be affected on datasets with
different sizes? Comparing results over different popula-
tions can help to estimate the minimum number of reports
needed by different levels of privacy guarantee, as well
as anticipating suitable configurations for practical cases.
If the results obtained are comparable to those offered by
Erlingsson et al [4], this will also verify the procedures
followed by them.
B. Experimental Design
The experiments proposed in this paper attempt to design
different scenarios that will allow the study of the effects
produced by the variation of privacy parameters. It will
thus observe the differences between original data and data
recovered from the RAPPOR reports, and also between data
recovered from different scenarios, this is, the scenarios with
the same number of malware sample reports but different
values of  and vice-versa.
RAPPOR requires a dataset with a considerable size and a
wide variety of participants. Special interest is often put on
finding data related to smartphones, as these devices contain
a significant amount of potentially sensitive information about
their users, and a considerable volume of data is collected
from them on a regular basis [29]. The chosen candidate
is a smartphone dataset destined for security research [11].
This dataset collected information about the devices of the
participants, at the same time that a fake piece of malware
was leaving traces. The election of this dataset is caused by
the presence of process names as one of the pieces of data
collected, establishing similarities between this experiment
and the one performed by [4]. Process names are a suitable
parameter for RAPPOR, as they are translated into a set of
strings, some of which should have a very strong presence,
such as system processes and common applications, while
others should scarcely appear.
1) Alteration of the Dataset: The dataset used is partially
available in public and fully by request [11]. In this work,
the partial public dataset was used, even in spite of the lack
of variety of users, as there are more than enough pieces of
data when sub-sampled. The field UUID, which represents the
UNIX millisecond timestamp of the reports’ collection, was
used as a field by which the records were grouped by, using
them as different RAPPOR users. As Listing 1 shows, more
than 300,000 users could be obtained using the UUID field
(a considerable number compared to the 10,000 users from
the second experiment made by Erlingsson et al [4]). This
represents each user as a one-time collection of the status of
the phone. With around 46 reports per user, compared to the
18 of Erlingsson et al [4], this sample should be more than
enough to obtain accurate results from RAPPOR. It could be
argued that this adaptation would change the meaning of the
data, but the experiment seeks to observe differences in the
distributions of recovered data, and not to learn from it.
Aside from the two attributes mentioned before (UUID
and process name), the rest of the data was obviated, as
it was not necessary for the experiment, making it more
simmilar to the original experiment. In the dataset, the column
"PackageName" was used to name the running processes.
While it is true that the column “ApplicationName" would
have provided a more human-readable output, the former one
was chosen as some applications contained unusual characters
that could lead to code execution errors.
Listing 1. Count of unique strings in [11]
>> awk ’BEGIN{FS = " , " } { p r i n t $2 ; } ’
A p p l i c a t i o n . csv | s o r t | un iq | wc − l
>> 307051
2) Election of Population Sizes: In their first experiment,
Erlingsson et al [4] used three different populations of 10,000;
100,000; and 1,000,000 responses to demonstrate the effect
of the reports collected and the quality of the retrieved
information. By using similar sizes, this experiment will allow
the verification of their empirical work. Looking at the dataset
that was chosen, even extracting one report from each user
would produce a sample of 307,051 records, as seen in Listing
1. In order to produce smaller samples, a selection of users is
chosen to obtain a reduced amount of records.
3) Election of  Values: In differential privacy, the accept-
able limits of the privacy guarantee parameter () range from
0.01 to 10 [22]. The value chosen by Erlingsson et al [4]
is  = ln(3), which sits in the middle of this range, therefore
being a parameter of medium privacy value. As the experiment
aims to be illustrative for the changes suffered between the
variations of the  parameter, the high value will be extracted
directly from the upper end (10) of the previously mentioned
range in the literature, while the low value will be 0.1. Tests
were run using 0.01, but no results at all were retrieved (0
detected occurrences of each candidate string). This fact is
illustrative by itself on how low this value of  may be for
the chosen population sizes, but the same conclusions can
be reached by using  = 0.1 (as it will be seen in the
following sections), and which also offers more information to
be discussed. Choosing 0.1 over 0.01 also offers an interesting
point of view on the experiment, as the proportion between
adjacent values would be 1:10.
C. Evaluation of Results
Some of the original work by Erlingsson et al [4] offer
limited information about the results of their experiments,
apart from the graphical comparisons between the original and
the recovered distributions. The type of data that this paper
will offer are discrete counts of appearances of each string
with a simple method to evaluate the accuracy. Apart from
the raw number of retrieved strings, each of the scenarios are
evaluated according to the proportion of recovered strings that
were detected with at least 80% accuracy. The proportions are
represented in comparison to the total of the strings detected,
and not to the total of the strings present in the original data.
In a real use case, the actual information of the population
would not be available, and thus it is considered to be more
illustrative representing the information in this manner, as
it depicts how much of the retrieved information is indeed
reliable.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Code Analysis
RAPPOR’s repository contains the core software for the
server side of RAPPOR, which it is organised into a set
of Python scripts that call R and C++ programs. Other sets
of utilities like client libraries, scripts for server automation
or web applications for easy simulations and data analysis
are also present. A further inspection of the documentation
(under the path doc/data-flow.md) revealed a highly detailed
description of the data needed and the modules to run on them
to obtain reports from original data, and a distribution from
the reports. Unfortunately, a check of the pipeline described in
the documentation (all scripted inside demo.sh) revealed that
some modules had been changed since the documentation was
created, and it is uncertain how these changes could affect the
original results.
B. Maximum Size of the Bloom Filters
Both the Python and the C++ clients offered in the reposi-
tory possess a limit of 32 bits for the size of the Bloom filter
used to generate the reports. In spite of this, according to
the experiments shown on the original paper, the sizes of the
Bloom filters used in them is considerably larger.
In [4], the first experiment uses Basic One Time RAPPOR,
which requires an individual bit for every candidate string,
and considering that 200 candidates were employed and that
the size of the filter has to be a number such as x = 2n,
the minimum size of this filter had to be 256 bits. The
second, third and fourth experiments used Bloom filters of
128 bits. Thus, it appears that the code used by Erlingsson
et al [4] may differ from the one offered in the GitHub
repository. Consequently, reproducing the exact scenario with
the code available is not possible. However, according to the
experiments made by [4], the size of the Bloom filter should
not affect the retrievability of the data, as it does not alter the
value of . A 32-bit Bloom filter with two hashes (used in this
work) offers 322 = 1024 different combinations, more than
enough compared to the 154 candidate strings present in the
experimental datasets.
C. Code Creation
A script [30] was created to automate the process of apply-
ing RAPPOR to a dataset and then retrieve meaningful data
from its outcome. This script essentially takes the necessary
components of the original demo and automated the process
to speed up the process.
D. Dataset Creation and sub-sampling
The data needed for feeding the pipeline consists on a
comma separated file with a header and two columns. The
first column is a unique identifier for every client, and the
second contains the value to encode. Using the previously
described dataset (named Applications.csv) [11], the AWK
command on Listing 2 was performed to extract the data
(dataset.csv) required for further sub-sampled datasets. The
CUT command on the same listing was used to remove blank
lines and extract a unique.txt file with unique strings within
the extracted dataset.
Listing 2. Data extraction from Application.csv
>> awk ’BEGIN{FS = " , " } { p r i n t $2 " , " $5 : } ’
A p p l i c a t i o n s . c sv > d a t a s e t . c sv
>> c u t −d ’ , ’ −f 5 A p p l i c a t i o n s . c sv |
s o r t | un iq > u n i q u e s . t x t
From this list, the before mentioned blank space and
the header “PackageName” had to be removed via manual
inspection. A script that creates subsamples from aleatory
selections of reports was elaborated to create the datasets for
the experiment [30]. This script enables to create such sub-
samples choosing the number of users and reports per user to
select. In this way, the populations of 10,000 and 100,000
pieces of data were created by selecting just one report
from users until completing the list, while the population of
1,200,000 pieces of data was constructed selecting four reports
from 300,000 users.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EXECUTION
The values of  decided on the methodology were ap-
proximated using the  calculator from [30]. As the number
of hashes affects the recoverability conditions [4], this value
was left unchanged and set to two hashes, the same number
used on the three of the experiments performed by Erlingsson
et al [4]. Table I show the configurations chosen for the
experiment. Each of these sets of values was collected in three
different files with the same structure. The files were named
params_01.csv, params_1.csv and params_10.csv.
TABLE I
VALUES CHOSEN TO OBTAIN DIFFERENT  FOR THE EXPERIMENT
 f h p q
0.1 0.75 2 0.5 0.55
1.0743 0.50 2 0.5 0.75
10.0184 0.01 2 0.05 0.90
A. Report Generation
Using the parameter files, different series of reports were
generated using the pipeline.sh script from [30]. This script
runs the pipeline for the three different datasets and the three
different parameter groups, creating a total of nine different
scenarios. After the generation of the scenarios, each set
of files (params.csv, counts.csv and map.csv) was uploaded
into the original analysis web application from [19]. The
application offered a summary file with estimation data and
a results file with the estimation of the appearance of the
different candidate strings.
The file results.csv, together with the original dataset for that
concrete experiment, was used to generate the final comparison
file through the script depicted using a summary generator
[30]. The resultant file compares the counts of candidate
strings in the original distribution versus the estimation. There-
fore, this file is suitable for being used on plotting software
to obtain the final graphics.
VI. EVALUATION
To establish an objective and precise evaluation methodol-
ogy, the results were compared by two criteria: Cases with
different population size but identical  values, and cases with
different  value on the same population.
1) Data Presentation: The information collected from the
experiment is shown in Figures 1-4. These figures will be
referenced throughout the section while the obtained results
are evaluated. In order to summarise the data extracted from
the experiment, Table II depicts the number of strings detected
by the analysis after these had been encoded in RAPPOR
reports.
2) Data Analysis: In order to illustrate more objectively the
results obtained, a statistical collector script [30] calculates the
number of detected strings that approximated the real count
with a 20% maximum margin of error, as defined in Table
II. This value is chosen to discard values too distant to the
original one.
A. Varying  Values
The value of  determines entirely the level of protection
provided by differential privacy. According to McSherry [31],
an  ≤ 0.1 should be considered as a strong guarantee
of privacy, while an  ≥ 10 should be considered as a
weak guarantee. In this section, these “strong” and “weak”
TABLE II
RAW RESULTS OF HIGH, MEDIUM, AND LOW PRIVACY GUARANTEES
Population  True strings RAPPOR strings 80% accuracy
10k 0.1 121 0 0
10k 1.0 121 7 1
10k 10.0 121 39 23
100k 0.1 140 1 0
100k 1.0 140 14 7
100k 10.0 140 60 40
1,200k 0.1 143 2 0
1,200k 1.0 143 47 24
1,200k 10.0 143 77 60
levels will be tested with the previously generated datasets,
to evaluate the quality of the recovered data that RAPPOR
can offer in these situations. An intermediate level of  = 1,
equidistant to the other two values by a proportion of 1:10, is
also included to show the transition and appreciate better the
changes that the recovered data suffer as the value of  varies.
 = 0.1: Table II shows how none of the recovered pieces
of data from the smaller  value could retrieve a single string
with less than a 20% margin of error. Even being ten times
higher than the smallest value found in literature [32], this
restriction appears to be too constraining to be useful in, at
least, datasets of the sizes used for this experiment. This also
confirms the conclusions of [31], saying that such a low value
for  produces considerably noisy responses, prone to offer a
very high false positive rate. In the case of Sarwate et al [32],
it could be justified the use of such a small value, as their
project focuses on machine learning, a field where processing
substantially larger datasets are rather common. Nevertheless,
without further testing, it is not possible to determine whether
the differential privacy mechanism concretely implemented by
RAPPOR would successfully retrieve useful information in
such conditions.
 = 1.0: Replicating the same privacy parameters used in
the experiments of Erlingsson et al [4], Figures 1-3 show how
significant the size of the population is when choosing privacy
values on RAPPOR. On the smallest population (Figure 1),
only some of the most popular strings are detected, with a
clear false positive at the tail of the distribution. Only 1⁄7 of
the detected values are accurately approximated, as given in
Table II.
In the medium population of 100,000, shown in Figure 2, the
most popular strings are properly retrieved to a certain level of
acceptance, with 50% of the detected values within the range
of 20% error. The tail still shows some false positive results,
but they are smaller in proportion and more evenly distributed
over the candidate strings. Despite the fact that the head of the
estimated distribution seems to start shaping closer to the real
data, only a few strings come close enough to the original,
being difficult to accurately determine even the heavy hitters.
Figure 3 shows how retrievability increase significantly
given greater amounts of data. In spite of this, with 10
Fig. 1. Noise on 10,000 responses using  = 1
Fig. 2. Noise on 100,000 responses using  = 1
times more data than the previous sample, the growth of
the proportion of strings detected within 20% becomes more
steady. This situation, inverted from the one described in the
transition from 10,000 to 100,000 users, could imply that a
higher increase in the number of reports is largely beneficial
to detecting new strings, but not as helpful in increasing the
accuracy of recovered data.
 = 10: With the weakest privacy guarantee, on the smallest
dataset, 32% of the original strings are recovered and 59% of
these within 20% error margin. In comparison, on the biggest
dataset 54% of the original strings are recovered, 59% of
these within the 20% error margin of the true number of
appearances. Thus, the number of accurate strings recovered
may not increase drastically between the two data sizes, but
there are significantly more strings detected on the larger
population. As it was expected from what was learnt from
literature, the original and the estimated distributions match
almost perfectly.
The amount of detected strings has a small growth from the
Fig. 3. Noise on 1,200,000 responses using  = 1
previous population size, compared to the growth of strings
detected with an 80% of precision, which could indicate that
the strings with smaller appearances cannot be detected even
with disproportionately sized datasets, while increasing the
number of reports collected contributes significantly to the
accuracy of the strings detected.
In the 100,000 population and with  = 1, the recovered
distribution already adopts very closely the shape of the
original dataset, as Figure 2 shows. 66.7% of the recovered
strings are inside the 20% margin of error.
B. Same Population Sizes
The samples exposed earlier will be now grouped by
population size, with the intention of evaluating the effects
of altering  on the same original distribution, and judge how
this affects the retrievability of the data.
Population of 10,000: In the transition from  = 0.1 to
 = 1, only 14.3% of the strings appear to be detected with
precision. It is interesting to notice that, according to Figure
1, the most important strings in the original distribution would
not be present in these groups, as their estimated values are
considerably distant from the original. This could be due to the
concentration of these values on a reduced number of cohorts,
making the detection more difficult with this level of privacy
guarantee. Passing from  = 1 to  = 10, the proportion
of detected strings grows acceptably, while 59% of these are
within the 20% margin of error and thus providing a highly
accurate detection rate.
Population of 100,000: A high growth of the 20% limit
is shown on the first transition from 0.1 to 1  value, going
from 0% to 50%. Figure 2 shows how the most accurate
values concentrate around the head of the distribution, while
the tail remains barely detected. Changing  to 10 causes the
estimation to grow considerably closer to the original data,
with a more modest growth in the 20% error limit.
Population of 1,200,000: Even the largest of the populations
show no successful results when being processed through the
more restricting privacy parameter. Although the detection
of the biggest string may be seen, not even this value is
approximated within at least 80% accuracy. The transition to
 = 1 recreates the head of the distribution rather accurately
(Figure 3), with 27.6% of the strings accurately detected.
The least demanding privacy restriction provides 77.9% of the
strings detected with less than a 20% error.
C. Further details of high privacy guarantees
As seen in the paper by Erlingson et al [4], limited privacy
guarantees were tested against three different population sizes.
Additionally, privacy guarantees were selected based on pop-
ular values in literature and did not present detailed results
on varying the privacy parameters. This section outlines the
results of applying RAPPOR on the three datasets with varied
privacy guarantees between  = 0.1− 1. Similar to the results
previously exposed, which are comparable and verifiable to the
results in [4], this evaluation will be based on the raw results
in Table III. Looking at Table III, six results are shown for
each population size, and further visualisation of these can be
seen in Figure 4. Figure 4 outlines a scatter-plot of the strings
retrieved with 80% accuracy observed for each  variation,
normalised over the true number of strings in each population
for each dataset.
1) Different impact on different population sizes: The in-
creased privacy guarantees affect the smallest dataset of 10,000
reports significantly, with no strings accurately detected with
strict privacy guarantees. This is, however, expected, as there
was just one string discovered in the previous experiment
(Table II), and stricter privacy guarantees would generate
greater levels of noise. The RAPPOR strings detected increase
and decrease through the varied privacy parameters, but never
approach the 80% accuracy barrier at any point for the small
dataset, except from  = 1. When observing the results of the
100,000 population, interesting conclusions can be extracted,
as the impact of decreasing privacy guarantees affects the re-
covery greatly at first, but then its growth slowly decays when
arriving to the more relaxed privacy guarantee values. It may
appear that the analytical value of using  = 0.6 over  = 0.7
remains the same even considering that the privacy guarantee
decreases. Nevertheless, as it was previously mentioned, dif-
ferential privacy and the RAPPOR algorithm performs better
on larger populations, with these inconsistencies being due
to the randomisation factor of the process. When observing
the 1,200,000 response data, a similar behaviour can be seen
when observing the impact of  = 0.6 and  = 0.7. However,
the overall accuracy is severely affected in comparison to
the smaller dataset. Logically, the smaller dataset is already
performing poorly and thus cannot be affected further, in
contrast to the larger dataset, which has over 15% strings
detected using  = 1.0 and down to 0.08% when increasing
the privacy guarantees.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper defined an experiment that created different
scenarios for altering the RAPPOR input values, and verified
TABLE III
HIGH PRIVACY PARAMETER VARIATION RESULTS
Population  True strings RAPPOR strings 80% accuracy
10k 0.5 121 1 0
10k 0.6 121 2 0
10k 0.7 121 0 0
10k 0.8 121 3 0
10k 0.9 121 1 0
10k 1.0 121 7 1
100k 0.5 140 8 2
100k 0.6 140 11 3
100k 0.7 140 12 3
100k 0.8 140 16 4
100k 0.9 140 15 5
100k 1.0 140 14 7
1,200k 0.5 143 22 11
1,200k 0.6 143 26 15
1,200k 0.7 143 28 17
1,200k 0.8 143 33 17
1,200k 0.9 143 35 21
1,200k 1.0 143 47 24
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
16.00
18.00
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
sgnirts eurt latot revo sgnirts derevocer fo 
%
ε
10K 100K 1000K
Fig. 4. Privacy Parameter Variation comparison between population sizes
that the results obtained by Erlingsson [4] in their experiments
are repeatable, ensuring the quality of their work. However,
utmost care must be taken when deciding on the privacy
parameters of RAPPOR. It was discovered that  = 0.1 was
a privacy guarantee too high to be met even in the most
optimistic of the scenarios, so it remains uncertain whether
this value would be usable for bigger populations. The 10,000
responses population only offered reliable results when the
privacy guarantee was lowered to almost non-existent levels
( = 10). It was appreciated that, after a certain threshold
of population size, data started to be meaningful, observing
great increases of accuracy from  = 0.7 and higher for both
the 100,000- and 1,200,000-sized datasets. After that initial
growth, the rise of acceptable detected strings slowed, starting
to increase the precision of the already discovered data instead.
This lead to the conclusion that, from the aforementioned
threshold onwards, collecting more reports would increase
the quality of the retrieved data, but not the raw number of
detected strigs.
One area of development is the difficulty of generating
Bloom filters larger than 32 bits. Even though the results
from Erlingsson et al [4] have been successfully verified, this
difficulty prevents the replication of the exact conditions of
their empirical work. Altering the code to make this feature
available would significantly improve the work done in this
paper. Also, this would help to create a more versatile tool,
adaptable to different situations. Additional tests over different
Bloom filter settings would also verify that the variation of
the size of the filters does not affect the recoverability of the
reports, as [4] assure.
The smallest of the chosen values of  showed that is
was impractical for populations of up to 1,200,000 reports.
A possible additional check would be to determine if such
a constraining privacy guarantee can be used with larger
populations, or if, on the contrary, this value makes RAPPOR
generate reports that are too noisy to be of any use.
Choosing three different sizes, the sub-sampled datasets
were created by randomly selecting one report per user for
the two smaller populations, and four different reports per user
for the largest one. Testing populations of the same size with
a different number of users and responses per user (e.g., one
response for 1000 users, two responses for 500 users, four
responses for 250 users. . . ) could help to further understand
the influence of the characteristics of the population in the
recoverability of the reports.
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